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The U.S. Legal System

COMMON VALUES, UNCOMMON PROCEDURES °

I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal appellate system in the United States has a
virus. Commonly known as "non-precedential decisions,"' this
virus exists in every circuit within the federal court system.
Much like a virus that infects the human body, nonprecedential decisions have wormed their way into the
© 2004 Kristen Marie Hansen. All Rights Reserved.
The phrase "non-precedential" has replaced the misnomer "unpublished"
when referring to decisions by federal appellate courts that decide only a particular
case and do not establish binding precedent. These non-precedential decisions arise
from "no-citation rules" that are established on a circuit-by-circuit basis and that
forbid, or allow in very limited form, citation in court documents to decisions termed
"unpublished." The term "unpublished" is a misnomer because these decisions are, in
fact, published in both electronic and hard copy form. However, though these decisions
are available to read, they are generally unavailable for citation purposes and thus are
non-precedential.
The fact that non-precedential decisions were actually unpublished in the
past is one reason used to justify no-citation rules.
In the past, some have... argued that, without no-citation rules, large institutional litigants (such as the Department of Justice) who can afford to collect and organize non-precedential opinions would have an unfair advantage.
Whatever force this argument may once have had, that force has been greatly
diminished by the widespread availability of non-precedential opinions on
Westlaw and Lexis, on free [Ilnternet sites, and now in the Federal Appendix.
In almost all of the circuits, non-precedential opinions are as readily available as precedential opinions. Barring citation to non-precedential opinions is
no longer necessary to level the playing field.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MINUTES OF FALL 2002 MEETING OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 1, 22-39 (2002) [hereinafter "Advisory
Committee Minutes"], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appll02.pdf;
see also Memorandum from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair of the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 22, 2003), at 27-36 (publishing
Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 for comment) [hereinafter Alito Memorandum], available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/ rules/app0803.pdf.
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appellate system through federal circuit courts' no-citation
policies and have begun to corrupt the fair and efficient
functioning of that system. The shocking effect has been to
render approximately eighty percent of all decisions made by
federal circuit courts today non-precedential' and, therefore,
unavailable for use by parties, advocates, and even judges.'
What this means, essentially, is that decisions made by federal
appeals courts are "tickets good for one ride" only.' As one
circuit court judge framed it, "[wie may have decided this
question the opposite way yesterday ...but that does not bind
us today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what we did
yesterday." The problem of non-precedential decisions is
demonstrated by this assertion: courts are not bound, judges
are not bound, and nobody knows what will happen tomorrow.
More to the point, nobody knows what happened yesterday.
To properly understand the far-reaching consequences
of the increase in non-precedential decisions, it is helpful to
note the manner in which their wide use has caused the U.S.
common law system6 to become more like a civil law system.'
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JuDIcIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES 2001, tbl.S-3 (2001) [hereinafter "ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE"], available
see also Tony Mauro,
at http:///www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/tables/s03sep01.pdf;
Judge Ignites Storm Over Unpublished Opinions, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Sept. 5,
2000.
3 While judges, practitioners, and legal scholars have debated the
constitutionality of such policies, the fact remains that these rules do exist and have
formed a body of law that is unaccessible as precedent. For a good discussion of the
constitutionality and desirability of non-publication policies, see Alex Kozinski &
Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don't Cite This!: Why We Don't Allow Citation to
Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAWYER, June 2000, at 43; Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr.,
Judges on Judging: In Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 183
(1999); Joshua R. Mandell, Trees that Fall in the Forest: The Precedential Effect of
Unpublished Opinions, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1255 (2001). For the opposite view, see
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en
banc 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
For a general overview of current national debates on the subject of the
constitutionality and desirability of non-publication policies, as well as discussion on
the practical impact of such decisions, see Appellate Practice Section of the Bar
Association of San Francisco, Unpublished Decisions: Caught Between Scylla and
Charybdis (April 24, 2001) (presenting opinions of panelists Judge Alex Kozinski,
Professor Stephen R. Barnett and Ms. Andrea Asaro) [hereinafter "Scylla and
Charybdis"], availableat http://www.nonpublication.com/discussion.pdf.
4 Adam Liptak, Federal Appeals Court Decisions May Go Public, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 25, 2002, at A21. This article provides a useful graph demonstrating the
percentage of opinions unpublished in each circuit court for the period from October 1,
2000 through September 30, 2001. Id. These percentages range from 60.2% in the
Seventh Circuit to 91.5% in the Fourth Circuit and average out to 80.4%. Id.
5 Id. (quoting Judge Richard S. Arnold of the Eighth Circuit).
6 For purposes of this Note, the term "U.S. system" will be used to refer to
the common law system developed and currently in force in the federal judicial system.
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While this analogy has limitations, it allows a clearer
elucidation of the problems and risks that may arise due to the
operation of frozen precedent within the common law system.
As a common law system, the U.S. legal system is based upon
the workings of stare decisis.8 On the other hand, civil law
systems rely on extensive and integrated codifications for
decision making rather than a system of precedential court
decisions While both systems have weaknesses, both also have
internal correctives, and it is in this regard that analogizing
code law and frozen precedent yields its greatest insight. When
a common law system begins to bear traits of a civil law
system, but lacks the internal correctives of such a system, the
opportunity arises for judges to make arbitrary and tangential
The terms "Continental approach" or "civil law system" will be used to refer to the civil
law system developed from Roman law and currently in force, in varying degrees, in
much of Europe and Latin America. The civil law countries examined in this Note are
primarily Germany and France.
7 "Civil law systems are legal systems of countries or other territorial units
(states or provinces of a federation) with a private law predominately based or
influenced by Roman Law (the ius civile)." George A. Zaphiriou, Introduction to Civil
Law Systems, in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 47 (Richard A. Danner &
Marie-Louise H. Bernal eds., 1994) (footnote omitted). Roscoe Pound elucidated three
different ideas of what a civil law system is: (1) "a complete legislative statement of the
whole body of the law so as to put it authoritatively in one self-sufficing form;" (2)
'republication in a systematic form of the whole mass of existing law of every kind, and
... separate codification of statute and [of non-statutory] law, adhering as closely as
possible to the language, conceptions, and methods of the old law;" and (3) "to provide
so far as possible a complete legislative statement of principles so as to furnish a
legislative basis for juristic and judicial development.., laying down rules sparingly
and for the analogies they furnish . . . ." ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES
RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LAW 96 (2d ed. 1977) (quoting Roscoe Pound, Sources and Forms of Law, 22
NOTRE DAME LAW. 1, 71-72 (1946). In essence, a civil law system is represented by
extensive codifications set forth by legislatures and elucidated by legal scholars. This
system does not rely on stare decisis but instead places the emphasis on the analysis of
rules for each new factual situation. See discussion infra Part II.A.
8 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 1 (2002) (stating
that the common law is
"inseparably identified with the decisions of the courts"). In general, stare decisis is the
practice of following the decisions of superior courts as precedential and binding.
Alexander Hamilton asserted that "[tlo avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them." Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 472 n.2 (2001) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO.
78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). David J. Luban defends
precedent by quoting Anthony Kronman, who stated that "[t]he force of precedent.., is
best understood through 'the traditionalist idea that the past possesses an authority of
its own.'" David J. Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035, 1040 (1991)
(citing Anthony T. Kronman, Precedentand Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1046 (1990)).
9 Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 51-52 (giving the four main characteristics of
civil law systems as (1) a moralistic and dogmatic approach to legal reasoning; (2)
"[e]xtensive and integrated codifications"; (3) the lack of stare decisis; and (4) different
procedures in criminal and civil trials).
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decisions that will ultimately degrade the function, efficiency,
faith in, and fundamental fairness of the U.S. legal system.
To substantiate the assertions above, Part II of this
Note compares some general features of the civil law and
common law systems, including origins, approaches to legal
reasoning, and the training, education, and selection of judges.
Part III demonstrates the code analogy discussed above,
namely that increasing numbers of non-precedential decisions
have shifted the common law system into a system that bears
the traits of a code system. Part IV emphasizes the effects of
this process by highlighting the loss of internal correctives
within the methodology of legal reasoning. Part V discusses the
corruption" of the U.S. legal system and Part VI recommends
ways to increase internal mechanisms for protection against
unfairness and inefficiency, including a discussion of Proposed
Appellate Rule 32.1."
II. THE CIL

A.

LAW AND THE COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS

Civil Law

The goal of the civil law system, or Continental
approach, is to "state in a general, orderly, integrated, and
complete way the rules of private law needed to regulate
private relations."" Thus, the civil law is primarily recognizable
to those outside of its system by its extensive and integrated
codifications. However, it can also be differentiated from the
U.S. system by the preeminence of legal scholars and the
insertion of a comprehensive and fundamental moral system at
the inception of modern codification. 3
These elements of a civil law system arose from the
manner of its origination. While the U.S. system developed on
the British Isles, the Continental approach sprung from
ancient Roman law as discovered and interpreted by medieval
10 The term "corruption" is used in the sense of corrosion, and is meant to
indicate the increase of uncertain variables within the judicial system.
" ADVISORY COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 1, at 22-39 (proposing and
approving Appellate Rule 32.1 in principle on November 18, 2002, pending approval in
a revised form at the May 15, 2003 Advisory Committee Meeting) (to be codified at
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1). See discussion infra Part VI (discussing elements of Proposed
Appellate Rule 32.1); see also Liptak, supra note 4 (discussing the proposed rule).
12 Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision: The Common Law's
Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 87, 94 (1998).
13 Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 51-52.
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1 during
scholars.1 4 The influence of natural law"
this time period
infused the interpretation of Roman law, and thus the
development of civil law, with a fundamental
and
comprehensive sense of morality. 6 The Continental approach is
both more dogmatic and didactic," in part because it was
originally based on Roman law, and in part because the Roman
writings were interpreted under the assumptions of a Godgiven natural law. 8
Roman law origination ultimately led to the
development of the code, as elucidated by legal scholars, as the
authoritative source of law within the Continental approach."
Primarily because legal scholars maintain preeminence,
decisions do not bind civil law judges but merely "inspire them"
14
15

Id.
"According to natural law legal theory, the authority of at least some legal

standards necessarily derives . . . from considerations having to do with the moral
merit of those standards." UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE AT MARTIN, INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, at httpi/www.utm.edu/researcliep/n/natlaw.htm (last
visited Jan. 8, 2004).
16 Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 51-52.
17 Id. "Dogma" is defined as "a definite authoritative tenet" and "didactic" as
"designed or intended to teach" and "making moral observations." See MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, availableat http//:www.m-w.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
1" William Blackstone states of natural law:
This law of nature, being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe,
in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their
authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 41 (University of
Chicago Press 1979).
'9 Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 47-48, 52 (stating that the influence of natural
law "filled in the vacuum during the Dark Ages" and led developing "civil codes [to]
refer expressly to morality").
Roman law was not simply interpreted and applied in a blanket form in all
civil law countries. Throughout the last two centuries alone there has been a
significant amount of legal scholarship and development of the code as interpreted
from Roman law. In addition, each country has its own scholarship and historical
practices which personalize the code to its needs. Nonetheless, there does seem to be an
'overwhelming sense of continuity of development." REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN
LAW, CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY 98 (2001).
Take Germany for example. In 1495 "[t]he whole body of Roman law, in
complexu, was . . . given the rank of statutory law in Germany." VON MEHREN &
GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 11. This law was the Roman law, not in the form of the sixth
century Corpus iuris, but the law as it was interpreted in light of natural law by
medieval scholars. Id. Some parts of the Roman law were simply ignored and some
remained primarily Germanic as it stood before the adoption of the Roman law. Id. In
addition, throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries many cities and regions
reformed their legal systems to reincorporate Germanic elements which had been
replaced. Id. This continuum of development has not halted. Thus, the idea of a blanket
form of adopted Roman law simply does not exist in the civil law system, though the
force of Roman ideals dominates to varying degrees.
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in their final interpretation of the code. 2 Instead, legal scholars
take a heightened role because their interpretation of the code
is considered authoritative in judicial decision making.
Because the code is the authoritative starting point in
civil law countries, it is to this source that civil law judges turn
when beginning legal reasoning.2 ' In the general methodology
behind civil law legal reasoning, a judge begins by identifying
the code provision that governs the present situation or issue.22
Once that code provision is determined, judges rely upon logic
to move from the generalities of individual code provisions to
case-specific decisions.23 Described by one scholar as "the
Drawer Theory,"" this process is a deductive approach whereby
the civil law judge "proceeds from a broad principle, expressed
in general terms, then considers the facts of the particular case
and finally, as in a syllogism, applies the principle to the facts
so as to reach a conclusion."25 It is important to note that this
type of deductive reasoning allows civil law practitioners and
20

VON MEHREN

&

GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1135 (citing A. COLIN & H.

CAPITANT, COURS PLPMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS § 36, at 40 (Julliot de la

Morandi~re ed., 11th ed. 1947)).
2, Id. at 1134-35 (stating that the code, or the general body of statutory law,
is the authoritative starting point for legal reasoning in France and Germany); see also
Peter G. Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Interpretation,in PETER
G. STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW: HISTORICAL
ESSAYS 131, 131 (1988) (stating "the official myth in the civil law is that, although
academic writings have authority, judicial decisions have none; in practice, however,
great attention is paid to the latter").
22 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1134-35. However, "[sluch is
not the case in every field of private law. For example, in both French and German law
very few legislatively given starting point [sic] for legal reasoning are avilable [sic] in
the field of private international law." Id. at 1134 n.19.
23 See Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TUL. L.
REV. 1591, 1597 (1992) thereinafter Stein, Roman Law].
24 See Phillipe Bruno, The Common Law From a Civil Lawyer's Perspective,
in INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 8 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise

H. Bernal eds., 1994). This theory describes the civil law methodology as one element of
reasoning leading logically to the next until the answer is discovered within the code
itself. Id. at 8-9. This methodology is "analogous to pulling drawers, one-by-one, until
one drawer contains the answer to the problem." Id. at 8. In other words, the civil law
judge first goes to one provision to determine its applicability. If that provision works
or if the facts can be forced into that provision, then he has found the answer. If,
however, that provision cannot govern the case at hand, the judge must then look to
the next provision to determine applicability. This process goes on and on until the
judge locates the applicable provision of the Code. Once the applicable provision is
located, he looks to it to find the appropriate rule of law. Id. at 8-9. If the rule of law
found is ambiguous it is then interpreted and clarified as directed by academic
writings. See Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at 1597. Only once the rule of law is
found in the code, and the writings of scholars consulted, does the civil law judge
consider judicial decisions to clarify an interpretation or understanding. Id.
25 Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at 1596.
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judges to present their arguments as if there can be only one
right answer to any legal problem.6 Because of this, civil law
judges generally do not issue dissenting opinions. 7 Instead,
every judgment, even in appellate cases, is given by the court
as a whole."
Though judges may present their arguments as if there
is only one right answer to a particular legal question, the
Continental approach actually gives trial judges great
flexibility in deciding particular issues simply because they are
not bound by precedent.' Each judge can decide which facts or
factors to emphasize in applying the general code principle to
the specific fact situation. ° However, this process is protected
from arbitrariness by a deductive methodology that has only
one authoritative starting point.' Furthermore, this starting
point, the code, has been legislatively determined and morally
introduced and, therefore, provides additional protections for
fairness."
This analysis is also protected by the manner in which
judges in the civil law system are educated, recruited, and
promoted. A civil law judge is traditionally revealed as "a
fungible person, one of a group of anonymous, almost colorless,
26 Id. ("This form of reasoning leads the civil-law lawyer to present
a legal

argument as if there can be only one right answer to any legal problem, and
disagreement on the application of the law to the facts of a case, must, in this way of
thinking, be the result of faulty logic by somebody.").
27 Id.
2

Id.

See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1135 n.21. Though there is
no stare decisis, "[decisions, especially a series of successive decisions reaching similar
results, have as a practical matter considerable influence upon the future judicial
handling of comparable situations." Id. Further, in theory, "this is not a binding rule of
law because.., in contrast to the case law ...other courts, and even those which made
the decisions that established the jurisprudence (case law), retain full freedom to
decide in a different way in similar cases that they will be called upon to decide in the
future." Id. (quoting COLIN & CAPITANT, supra note 20) (internal quotations omitted).
For example, orthodox French theory, though among the more restrictive
in the civil-law community, recognizes the nonmechanical nature of the judicial process
by observing that "the written law is neither complete nor unambiguous." Id. at 1135.
French courts, in rendering judicial decisions, will consider both the language of the
code as well as "the social end that rendered the statute necessary." Id.
German theory, as well, recognizes the nonmechanical nature necessary in
rendering judicial decisions and agrees that codified law is not complete and
unambiguous. Id. at 1136. German courts, in addition, "have in certain situations the
right to deviate from legislatively given rules" and give weight to the words and
organization of the code as well as to its legislative history, and various
interpretations. Id.
31 Id. at 1134.
32 See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the origination
of civil law from
natural law).
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individuals who hide their personality behind the collegiate
responsibility of the court."33 This begins with the type of legal
education provided under the Continental approach: the
lecture method. ' These lectures "incline toward an exposition
of general principles from which the results in concrete cases
are derived by a process of deductive reasoning."' The lecture
method, therefore, mirrors the deductive legal analysis that
each prospective civil law judge will someday utilize. The
lectures consist of an explanation and elucidation of the specific
code provisions that must be applied. This way of teaching
provides less opportunity for "a full exploration of the factual
background of individual decisions and less incentive for such
effort." ' Educators are not seeking, necessarily, to provide
examples of specific situations in which the provision at hand
operates. Instead, importance is placed on the generalities of
each provision so that their full impact can be understood."
Because no decision binds the next, the specific facts of each
case become less important, and there is less incentive for a
judge to explore them.
A civil law judge is, in substance, a member of a
specialized branch of the general bureaucracy. 3' A civil law
judge's judicial career begins when he is very young, generally
right after he completes his legal education and enters the
judiciary at an entry-level position. ' The prospective judge in
the civil law system makes a decision to pursue this avenue of
law and does not need to wait for an appointment or election.4'
In fact, one ordinarily enters the judicial branch by passing an
examination."' In terms of promotion, a young civil law judge
can expect to advance to a higher court only "after long service
in lower courts."42 This system is very slow by nature and adds
to the bureaucratic character of the judicial branch. In
addition, as career civil servants, civil law judges are not
compensated at the same level as legal practitioners or

3" Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at 1597.
34
35

VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1139.
id.

36

Id.

37 Id.

Id. at 1148-49.
VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1148-49.
40 Id. at 1150.
41 Id. at 1148-49.
at 1148-49.
42 Id.
3'

39
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scholars.4 3' Though they "enjoy some social prestige and . . .
economic security," being a member of the judiciary is still not
very appealing in either of these areas. As a practical matter,
a civil law judge does carry a certain level of prestige. However,
it seems as if this prestige may be more properly akin to the
prestige awarded to a professor rather than a judge in the
United States.
Because of the bureaucratic nature of the judicial bench
in civil law countries and the mechanical application of code
provisions in decision-making, it is not surprising that civil law
judges are described as fungible. 5 Mature and successful
practitioners or legal scholars seldom migrate to the bench '6
because this would not be an ascension, as it is in the United
States. Additionally, appointing a mature individual would
inevitably cause a disruption in the fairly regular system of
recruitment and advancement." This combination of a slow,
bureaucratic process and the necessity of entering the judiciary
at a very young age does not appeal to the most forceful,
Furthermore,
colorful, or energetic personality types."
"individuality is lost in a collegiate bench that does not permit
the expression of concurring or dissenting opinions." 49 Though
Germany's "handling of the facts and the law.., is fuller than
in French decisions," neither France nor Germany permits
members of its judiciary to sign their opinions, let alone state a
dissent.' All opinions come from the court as a whole. Again,
the civil law judge is in a position where his decisions must be
subjugated to the opinions of the other members of the court. 5
43 Id. at 1148 n.80. Von Mehren and Gordley state that "a French judge does
not earn as much as a good lawyer, but is well paid for a civil servant," id., and that
"[tihe economic situation of the German judge [also] appears to be unsatisfactory." Id.
at 1148-49.
VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1148-50.
45 Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at
1597.
46 See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1148-49. Von Mehren
and
Gordley also go on to describe some changes occurring in the civil law system. "One of
the reforms today urged in Germany is to recruit judges from among persons of mature
age who have proved themselves in other forms of legal activity." Id. at 1149 n.83.
47 Id. at 1150.
41 Id. at 1149 n.84 (stating "[tihe customs of civil-code countries do
not
develop a Bench or Bar of comparable prestige, creativeness or independence ... Court
opinions rarely bear the name of the writer, dissents are not permitted, and the judicial
post offers less incentive to originality in the judge").
'9 Id. at 1149.
5o VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1140-41 & n.53.
5, See id. at 1140 n.53 (citing Batiffol, Contrastes entre l'esprit juridique
anglo-saxon et l'esprit juridique continental, 14 Annales de Droit et de Science
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Thus, it should come as no surprise that the typical
Continental judge tends to be an anonymous figure,
indistinguishable from other members of the judiciary.
The limited function and role of the civil law bench
coincides with the bureaucratic method of appointment to the
bench, as well as with subsequent advancement. Civil law
judges do not create the law, as an American judge does."
Instead their role is to interpret and apply the written law as
directed by legal scholars.'
Yet, from another point of view, civil law judges have a
great deal of individual power. Because their decision-making
capacity is not limited by prior decisions, they are able to bring
a sense of flexibility and individuality to decision making.
Moreover, they are able to respond more precisely to the
different parties' interests. However, this is limited by the
prominence of academics, whose writings are persuasive
interpretations of the code. Therefore, while civil law judges
have ultimate power in adjudicating specific disputes, their
ability to affect the general law is more limited.'
B.

Common Law

The common law method was founded in England on
ancient local rules and customs." With the centralization of
power in feudal times, this amalgamation of rules and customs
began to evolve in King's courts into the principles under which
it now operates.' The common law, as it was known in
England, migrated to this country with the first English
colonists." After the separation from England, the colonists in
each state adopted, by express provision or through judicial
decisions, the principles of common law.' The common law is
Politique 3, at 7 (1954)) ("[11n France, the judge takes an oath, when he is named, not
to reveal the differences of opinion on the bench").
52 See RAYMOND YOUNGS, SOURCEBOOK ON GERMAN LAW 4-6 (1994).
53id.

Id. at 52. This is not entirely true since other decisions in the civil law
system are often used to clarify an understanding or interpretation of a code provision.
However, such decisions are secondary authority at best and not binding as
authoritative law.
55 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law §
3 (2002).
5Id.

57 Id.

"8 Id. At times throughout the history of the American legal system, civil law
ideals had a great effect on contemporaneous thinking. In addition, many jurisdictions
adopted portions of the civil law. See infra text accompanying note 68.
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broadly concerned with public policy, tradition, and precedent,
and these broad concerns have led to a system that is typically
justified on the grounds of basic fairness, gradualness,59
adaptability,' predictability, stability,6 ' and rule precision. 2 On
the other hand, the common law approach may also be
considered less creative and less rational than the typical
codified system.' For our purposes it is important to note that
today the common law prevails throughout the United States
except where it has been explicitly modified or repealed by
statute."'
As opposed to the civil law system, the U.S. legal system
relies upon the idea of stare decisis, or precedent.' This has led
to a great and inherent respect for tradition within the common
law system. In fact, some scholars believe that tradition should
be adhered to as "one of the great social forces of justice"' and
that the binding force of precedent is best illuminated when
59 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 97 (1982)
(stating that "[clommon law rules become dominant slowly over time in response to
many separate decisions in real cases by many disparate judges").
Cappalli, supra note 12, at 99.
61 Id. at 100 (citing RICHARD B. CAPPALLI, THE AMERICAN
COMMON LAW
METHOD ch.10 (1997)) (stating that "[slignificant change in the common law is
infrequent, mostly because legal change is slow-paced and incremental . . . [which]
means that common law rules are reasonably stable and that their context and use are
reasonably predictable").
62 Id. at 99.
Bruno, supra note 24, at 2 (stating that codification is a "construction
of
the mind, designed to impose a rational and well defined legal order on a particular
society").
15A AM. JUR 2D Common Law § 10 (2002). Exceptions to this statement
include the state of Louisiana, and the territory of Puerto Rico, where the civil law
prevails in civil matters. Because this Note is focusing on the federal law, these
anomalies, among others, will not be dealt with.
For further illumination on the role of the civil law in the United States,
see Miller v. Letzerich, 49 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Tex. 1932) (holding that statutes in force in
Texas before the introduction of the common law must be construed in light of Mexican
civil law). See also Menendez v. Rodriguez, 143 So. 223 (Fla. 1932) (holding that the
civil law of Spain is not in force in Florida except as portions of such civil law may be
incorporated in statutory enactments).
5 Black's Law Dictionary defines stare decisis as meaning
"to abide by, or
adhere to, decided cases." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990), cited in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 954 (1992).
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that stare decisis is a powerful concern that
binds courts to legal precepts. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 944 (1994). The Court goes
on to state, however, that "stare decisis 'is a principle of policy' and it 'is usually the
wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than it be settled right.'" Id. at 945 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808, 828 (1991)).
Luban, supra note 8, at 1036 (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter and citing
BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 68 (1983)).
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viewed in light of the traditionalist premise that "the past
possesses an authority of its own. " '
Precedent is not the only source of law in the U.S.
system. In fact, statutes are the source of much law in the
United States.' In situations where the law has been developed
through statutes, created and approved by the legislature, legal
analysis is much closer to the civil law system. However
important statutes are in framing the law in the U.S. system,
where the source of law is statutory, the effects of nonprecedential decisions do not rise to the same level and thus
will not be specifically addressed in this Note.'
Id. at 1040 (citing Kronman, supra note 8,at 1046).
This Note exclusively focuses on common law. For a brief discussion of how
unpublished opinions affect statutory law, see infra note 69.
To clarify this point, where legal analysis begins with a legislatively
enacted statute, rather than with a line of cases decided by judges in their individual
capacities, the law has a greater presumption of legitimacy in part because the
legislature is deemed to be an administrative arm of the people. THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (May 28, 1816), in 11 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 527 (Paul Leicester Ford ed. 1904-05) (stating "[tihe mass of
citizens is the safest depository of their own rights"). Thus statutory laws, in theory,
have internal correctives which arise from the responsibility legislators have to their
constituencies, as well as the watchdog role that members of the various constituencies
take in monitoring their representatives. Id.; see also Walter F. Murphy, Civil Law,
Common Law, and Constitutional Democracy, 52 LA. L. REV. 91, 102 (1991) ("The
probability of defeat at the next election deters officials from even seeming to infringe
on civil rights."). Ideally statutes will contain the values and morals of a group of
people representing the values and morals of the entire nation. Id. ("it is a particular
set of processes that make governmental decisions morally binding: the people's freely
choosing their representatives, those representatives' proposing, debating, and
enacting policy (and later standing for reelection), and then executive officers' enforcing
that policy according to directives from the people's representatives"). Similar
correctives exist within the civil law system which utilize legislatively enacted codes,
originating in Roman law and infused with natural law morality. See discussion supra
Part II.A (discussion concerning the origination of civil law from natural law). As such,
statutory law has a greater affinity with the code system in civil law countries.
Statutory law is equally important in the U.S. system, and according to
some scholars, increasingly prevalent and controlling. See Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947); Ellen Ash Peters,
Common Law Judging in a Statutory World: An Address, 43 U. PITr. L. REV. 995
(1982); Robert F. Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Education: Still Second Class After
All These Years, 35 MERCER L. REV. 803, 804 (1984) (noting the dramatic increase in
the importance of statutes in the American legal system). However, where legal
analysis begins with statutory law, conversion into a civil law system does not bear the
same consequences. In essence, the statutory system, being akin to civil law codes, has
similar internal correctives which negate many of the problems that arise when
precedents are treated as codes. Legislative legitimacy is one of these internal
correctives. Though statutory law is essential in the U.S. system, the effects that arise
from the conversion of decisional aspects of the U.S. system into statutory or code
aspects, absent those necessary internal correctives leads to a corrosion of the system
at all levels. For example, analogous case law is used to interpret applicable statutes
and to discover legislative intent. However, when case law is corrupted through
unavailability or arbitrary availability, this affects judicial interpretation of legislation.
67
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Although precedents, and statutes for that matter, are
the authoritative starting point for legal analysis within the
U.S. system, they are not the only factors taken into account by
judges in the common law system. In fact, the common law
decision-maker may consider the "entire wealth of received
tradition and usage, fundamental principles, modes of
reasoning, and the substance of its rules as illustrated by the
reasons on which they are based, rather than the mere words
in which they are expressed."" Thus, judges in the U.S. legal
system pay a great deal of attention to the public policies that
underlie the rule of law when applying it to the case at hand.7 '
The policies found within precedential law in the U.S. system
are the counterparts to the natural law morality that infuses
the civil law codes. Because public policies change as the tide of
public opinion ebbs and flows, the U.S. system must have the
ability to adjust accordingly. Precedential law creates a system
that is dynamic and has an inherent capacity for growth and
change.
On its most basic level, the common law system is
concerned with facts, and the reasoning underlying decisions in
the U.S. legal system reflects that focus." While in the civil law
the authoritative starting point for judicial decision making is
the code, in the U.S. legal system, the authoritative starting
point is a statute" or, as we will focus on here, a line of cases.
As opposed to the civil law system where a code provision is the
law, in the U.S. legal system a practitioner can look at dozens
of court decisions and still wonder what the rule of law is." As
opposed to one starting point and one answer presented, the
common law can present many possible starting points
(precedents) and many possible answers, including concurring
and dissenting opinions."6 In this approach the unifying factor
is the facts. Tellingly, in most situations, there is no way to
It is important to note that where a statute has been subject to a line of decisions
which have a controlling impact on its interpretation in an individual fact pattern, that
statutory interpretation is subject to the same weaknesses discussed in this Note in
regards to purely precedential, or judge made, law.
70 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 1 (2002).
71 Id.
§ 2.
72 See infra text accompanying
note 101.
73 See supra text accompanying note 69.
74 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1133.
75 Bruno, supra note 24, at 4-5.
76 This statement is simplified for purposes of this Note as both systems
allow for varying results in differing degrees. Furthermore, each system also allows
variance to the starting point in legal analysis.
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locate the law until the facts have been pinned down. It is
usually not difficult to find authority that supports whatever
proposition is posited. The difficulty lies in determining "what
effect a slightly different shade of facts will have" on the
outcome of a case and "to predict the speed of the current in a
changing stream of law."77 Thus, in order to frame a conclusion
based on a changing state of law, a common law practitioner or
judge is forced to distinguish precedents based on facts until he
can go no further. The rule of law that remains is the answer."
This methodology can be understood as the Stepping Stone
Approach.79 It is the common law methodology that begins with
a line of cases, applies the facts, and distinguishes precedents
until it determines the rule of law.
The application of law in the common law system is also
affected by the education, recruitment, and advancement of
judges within its system. In contrast to the Continental lecture
method,' the U.S. system uses case theory as its general
method of legal education." Case theory tends to emphasize
considerations of policy and fact, rather than the exposition of
general principles. 2 This serves the function of directing the
attention of prospective judges to the "nonmechanical nature of
the judicial process" because each set of facts will always be
77 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1134 n.15 (quoting William 0.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949)).
78 Bruno,

supra note 24, at 4-5.
methodology of U.S. legal analysis can be described as a Stepping
Stone Approach. The analysis starts with consideration of the facts. Under this
approach a common law practitioner or judge finds the rule of law by looking first to
the actual events, parties and circumstances of the case at hand. This methodology is
similar to crossing a creek by jumping from rock to rock. On one shore is the land of
facts, or the place where actual people are doing actual events, and, on the other side,
is the rule of law. In order to reach the rule of law, a judge or practitioner must jump
from precedent to precedent, or rock to rock, and with each leap, distinguish his facts
from the facts that support each previous case. In this way, the common law lawyer can
reach the rule of law and, on looking back, see the line of cases that brought him there.
Without the facts, this analysis could not even begin. And without precedents, or the
stepping stones, there is no way to reach the rule of law. See generally Cappalli, supra
note 12, at 98-99; Bruno, supra note 24, at 4-5.
79 The

80 See discussion supra Part II.A.
81 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1139. This is a broad

generalization. Though case theory has been and still is the primary education method
of law schools within the United States, there is a strong and continuing debate on
whether case law education is the most desirable or should be the only method. See
generally Claudio Grossman, Building the World Community: Challenges to Legal
Education and the WCL Experience, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 815 (2002). Different

methods are utilized on a smaller scale within every school, clinical training being one
prominent example. Id. at 827.
8'VON MEHREN & GoRDLEY, supra note 7, at 1139.
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unique to each case.'8 In essence, a law student in the United
States becomes increasingly aware of the individuality of each
specific fact pattern, and begins each analysis with an
exposition of its particularities, rather than an exposition of
generalities. Furthermore, most schools base fundamental legal
courses on national law," rather than on the particularities of a
certain jurisdiction.8 " Therefore, the common law method of
educating is not rigidly dogmatic but rather inherently
incorporates a greater scope of factors for decision making.'
This method of educating prospective judges has a great effect
on the ultimate decision-making processes used by these
individuals, as well as on the entire U.S. system. Because
national law covers a broad geographical area, the particular
factual situations faced are diverse. As such, a student of
national law is exposed to a broad gamut of situations that
permit him to develop a store of experiences from which to
draw upon in the future.
Moreover, in the U.S. legal system, the bench has
historically attracted men and women with "forceful
personalities" away from lucrative practicing professions." The
ideal of a strong judicial personality has further developed as
legal professionals in the U.S. system continue to view judges
as lawmakers. Furthermore, most judges are elected or
appointed at a mature age and in the midst of successful
careers, bringing with them the kind of self-assurance and
confidence that comes with professional success.' They often
&3Id.
84 This "national law" tends to be either federal law, which is applicable in
each state within its federal courts, or an amalgamation of various state law which
demonstrates the majority and minority trends of the specific course of study. Id.
(stating that 'the common law that is taught [cannot] be rigidly dogmatic" since it is
based on approximately 49 different systems of substantive law).
8

Id.

See supra note 84.
VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1148-49. While the phrase
"forceful judicial personalities" is perhaps a bit presumptuous, it is clear that judges,
both male and female, who occupy the bench in the U.S. federal appellate system are,
on the whole, confident decision makers who have the ability to formulate and present
determinative opinions. Judges in the U.S. system have predecessors such as Judge
Learned Hand and Judge Benjamin Cardozo to look to for guidance in their roles as
judges. These judicial examples lead other judges to mimic and perpetuate strong
personalities as they recognize that this is desirable in the U.S. system. In addition,
the important role of the Supreme Court, as well as the immense respect the Justices
of the current bench receive, lends credence and continuance to these judicial attitudes.
Thus, though a presumptuous statement, I believe that judges, at the very least, bring
the ideal of the forceful judicial personality when ascending the bench.
8' Id. at 1150.
87
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come to the judiciary with the idea that "the judge is the hero
of the common law."9 Judges in the U.S. system are "thus
encouraged and stimulated by historical example to leave
[their] mark on the law."' More importantly, a judge in the
common law system is not a member of a bureaucratic
institution as is the civil law judge.' American judges do not
have to serve for many years in a lower court in order to be
appointed to a higher court. Individuals can be directly
appointed or elected to higher courts, or spend their entire lives
in a lower court.' As such, there is not a typically bureaucratic
aspect to their recruitment, and the appointment of mature
individuals does not hinder the recruitment or advancement of
others in the same sense that it does in the civil system.
In addition to their essential law-making role, judges in
U.S. courts also perform an important political function
through judicial review of the constitutionality of legislative
and executive action.3 As such, appointment to the federal
bench, at any level, is highly desirable and carries with it a
sense of prestige. This prestige continues because judges in the
U.S. legal system form a small and elite group, and judges in
the appellate system are an even smaller and more elite part of
the greater whole. "[T]he call to maintain a small and exclusive
federal appellate judiciary has not come from the public, or
even from the bar . . . [but] appears to be championed by
federal judges . . . rooted in a preference for a small-court
culture."' Judges, coming from generally powerful and
successful careers, bring the effects of this success to the
bench. Without this perception of being a member of an elite
society, mature and successful practitioners and scholars would
not ascend to the bench in the U.S. legal system - the incentive
simply would not exist.'

89 Id.
90Id.
91 Id.

at 1146.

See VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1150.
93 Id. at 1146. See also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the
New Certiorari:Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 338
(1996) (quoting Judge Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeals,
77 JUDICATURE 288 (1994)).
95 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1150.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text; cf discussion supra Part II.A
(discussing the role of judges in the civil law system).
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III. THE EXISTENCE AND PREVALENCE OF NON-PRECEDENTIAL
DECISIONS FREEZES PRECEDENT

The U.S. legal system, "inseparably identified with the
decisions of the courts," 7 becomes frozen when decisions are
divorced from their underlying situation-specific patterns.' In
other words, stagnation occurs where the connection with facts
is lost. This diminished identification began with the 1964
Judicial Conference of the United States when policies
permitting unpublished and non-citable decisions in the federal
circuit courts came into effect." These no-citation rules, as a
general proposition, allow judges in the federal courts of
appeals to "authorize the publication of only those opinions
which are of general precedential value . ...
Where noncitable decisions are prevalent, the rules of law determining a
specific outcome have become divorced from fact."'
97 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law § 1 (2002).

98 Again, this does not address the issue of statutory law. See discussion
supra note 69.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1964).
'0 Id. The no-citation recommendation of the Judicial Conference of the
United States also applies to the district courts. However, the limited scope of this Note
prohibits the consideration of this facet of the recommendation.
'0' See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing frozen precedent). It is
important to note that decisions that are published and become the opinions set forth
by the circuit courts are, in fact, based on a real set of facts. This includes those
opinions that stem from a line of cases, a significant portion of which have been
relegated to the realm of non-precedential authority. However, these decisions, even
though based in facts are nonetheless divorced from fact precisely because all instances
of precedent are not available for the practitioner to distinguish or analogize. This is
most effectively discussed from the practical standpoint. For example, imagine you are
a lawyer for a small firm and a client approaches you with a legal problem. When you
research this problem to discover the rule of law you will most likely find at least a
small variety of cases which illuminate the issues you have extracted from your client's
problems. With these cases in hand you begin to move from case to case, distinguishing
or analogizing your client's factual situation. In this way you will eventually find the
rule of law. The problem arises, however, when you are faced with at least one, though
perhaps a number of cases which deal with your client's issue but are deemed
.unpublished." Though "unpublished," these cases nevertheless shed light on how
courts have been treating the resolution of your issue. The difficulty is that when you
go to court, your client's problem may be resolved in an entirely different way than the
way in which the problems in the unpublished opinions were decided. As such, this new
decision, though based on his factual situation, is in fact divorced from the factual
situations in other like instances.
There is also an argument that some unpublished opinions, such as those
decided in equity, or based on a totality of the circumstances test, call for judicial
discretion and thus would not lead to frozen precedent. However, any time that facts
are applied to a test or a rule of law, whether based in equity, or based on simple
judicial discretion, they illuminate the way that the rule of law has been applied and
will likely be applied in the future. It is a great disadvantage to litigants and
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A prime example of this phenomenon occurred in the
case of Johnson v. Knable. 2° In Johnson, the plaintiff, a prison
inmate, was denied a position working in the prison's education
department. As a result of this denial, the inmate brought an
action against the prison alleging that he was denied the job
due to his sexual orientation. The Fourth Circuit held that if, in
fact, the prison officials did deny the inmate a position due to
his sexual orientation, they may have violated the plaintiffs
equal protection rights. This issue was one of first impression
for the Fourth Circuit and would perhaps have "made
homosexuality subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal
Protection Clause.'.. Yet, the decision was unpublished."
"Thus, the court created a progressive rule for civil rights
litigants and then hid it from public scrutiny.""' 5
Johnson is a clear example of the risks inherent in the
use of unpublished opinions. One commentator has even gone
so far as to claim that Johnson was intentionally unpublished
by the Fourth Circuit in an attempt to "hide [a] controversial
decision[]" and "shield" that decision from review." Moreover,
this decision may have allowed the Fourth Circuit to "chart a
more progressive course than it ordinarily would have taken." "'
While this may or may not have been the intention of the
Fourth Circuit, the fact remains that an issue of first
impression was relegated to the realm of hidden law through
the court's use of the unpublished opinion format.'°
practitioners to have this hidden from view. Moreover, precedent does in fact become
frozen in the sense that fact-sensitive legal tests will not evolve or develop along the
lines in which they are designed. Even with a totality of the circumstances test, a court
will look to prior decisions to find the scope of its application. When precedent is frozen,
the outer edges of a rule of law become blurred, and the potential for arbitrariness
increases.
102 No. 90-7388, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12125 (4th Cir.
May 28, 1991).
,o Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of Precedent: Selective
Publication,Depublication,and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109, 128 (1995).
"o Id. at 110.
105 Id.
116 Id. at 110, 128.
...Id. at 128.
'0" Slavitt goes on to note that "[blecause an unpublished opinion cannot be
cited as precedent, the Supreme Court is hesitant to devote its limited resources to
reviewing a case that will have little future effect." Id. at 127. On the other hand, it is
important to acknowledge that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to appeals
from unpublished decisions. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm't
Distrib., No. 00-56703, 2002, U.S. App. LEXIS 7426 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003); Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publ'ns, Inc., No. 88-1679,
1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 25881 (10th Cir. Mar. 8, 1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 808
(1990).
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The Johnson case demonstrates an example of frozen
precedent. The decision departed from established law and
created a rule of law around a new factual situation. However,
because it was unpublished, no new litigant could cite to either
its facts or its rule of law to determine his own situation. Once
a principle becomes unavailable, the common law can no longer
operate with the Stepping Stone Approach' and decisions
become tangential and precedent frozen in time.
It is at this point that the analogy to the civil law
system becomes helpful. In fact, it is at this point that the
common law judge begins making decisions using deduction
akin to the Drawer Theory. ° To illuminate this shift, this Part
will first discuss the origination of, and reasoning behind, the
federal appellate courts' no-citation rules. Then it will further
discuss the creation of frozen precedent.
A.

The OriginationOf, and Rationale Underlying, Federal
Appellate Courts' No-CitationRules

In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States
made a recommendation that the federal circuit courts adopt
rules authorizing the publication of only those decisions whose
opinions would be of general precedential value."' Since that
time every federal court of appeals has adopted a rule allowing
109 See discussion supra Part II.B.

See discussion supra Part II.A.

1
Johanna S. Schiavoni, Who's Afraid of Precedent?: The Debate Over the
PrecedentialValue of Unpublished Opinions, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1860 (2002). For
example, the Fourth Circuit rule states as follows:
Opinions delivered by the Court will be published only if the opinion satisfies
one or more of the standards for publication:
i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or explains a rule of
law within this Circuit; or
ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
iii. It criticizes existing law; or
iv. It contains a historical review of a legal rule that is not
duplicative; or
v. It resolves a conflict between panels of this Court, or creates a
conflict with a decision in another circuit.
4TH CIR. R. 36(a), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/rules.pdf. Other courts
follow different, but similar rules. For example, the 7th Circuit will publish an opinion
when it "establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law." 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1)(i).
The Eighth Circuit encourages publication of an opinion when it "establishes a new
rule of law or questions or changes an existing rule of law in this Circuit." 8TH CIR. R.
4(a). In addition, the Sixth Circuit provides for publication of an opinion that "discusses
a legal or factual issue of continuing public interest," 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(3), while the
D.C. Circuit allows publication when an opinion "warrants publication in light of other
factors that give it general public interest." D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2)(G).
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selective publication of opinions and restricting the
precedential value of those unpublished opinions."' In general,
unpublished opinions are not published in bound volumes, such
as the Federal Reporter." However, they are today widely
available in electronic form on Westlaw or LexisNexis, and
many are also available on the producing court's website."'
Thus, though these decisions are termed "unpublished" they
are in fact available to most practitioners and even to many
litigants."5 The crux is that though they are available in the
sense that they can be located and read, they are not widely
available for citation and are afforded no precedential value."'
Practitioners are, in some cases, forbidden from citing to these
decisions, even merely for their persuasive value, in court
7
proceedings and filings."
The rationale underlying the use of non-precedential
opinions, as well as the recommendation of the Judicial
Conference permitting their use, is based primarily on a
practical concern of alleviating burgeoning circuit court
caseloads."8 For example, in 1960 a federal circuit court judge
was required to make decisions and write opinions on
approximately fifty-seven cases per year, while a judge in 1999
was confronted with the daunting task of adjudicating
approximately 305 cases per year. These exploding caseloads
led the Committee on Long Range Planning to seek a remedy
in the form of no-citation rules."'
In addition, the Committee sought to slow the increase
in the number of reported opinions out of a sense that these
proliferating opinions could lead a judge to make inconsistent
112

See supra note 111 and accompanying text.

"3 See, e.g., Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L. Cranford, Federaland State Court
Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESs 251,
253 tbl.1 (2001) (setting forth various courts' citiation and publication rules).
See, e.g., id.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing one original reason for
no-citation policies as being their wide unavailability to certain classes of litigants).
116 See also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying
text.
117 Liptak, supra note 4 (providing graphical information).
118 Schiavoni, supra note 111, at 1860-61. Between 1934 and 1960, circuit
court filings grew at an average annual rate of only about 0.5%. In 1960, however,
3,899 appeals were filed before 68 circuit court judges. In 1994, there were 48,322
filings before 179 judges while in 1999 those numbers had increased to 54,693 filings
for 179 judges. The number of filings in the federal appellate courts thus jumped
1240%, while the number of judges increased by only 263%. See Roger Parloff,
PublicationRights: It's Time to End the Patently Unfair Practiceof Selective Precedent,
AM. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 15.
19 Parloff, supra note
118.
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rulings. ' The fear was that "promiscuous publication ...could
compromise the integrity of the common law by making it
increasingly likely that judges, unable to digest the burgeoning
volumes of case law, would inadvertently make inconsistent
rulings.".1 Though this appears unlikely for the simple reason
that a judge will generally look to the most recent authoritative
precedent, the possibility of inconsistent decisions nonetheless
exists.'
Since no-citation rules have been advanced, both
theoretically and in practice, many scholars have debated the
constitutionality and desirability of unpublished, non-citable
decisions. In opposition to the rationale underlying the nocitation rules, some scholars have suggested that decisions
should be published and citable because (1) "they explain to
the parties why the decision came down the way it did... ;" (2)
"they provide some assurance that the decision is based on
rational, legitimate criteria rather than less permissible ones;"
(3) "[they] enable the decision to make law for future decisions;"
(4) "[they] contribute to stability in the law . . . [because]
decisions are based on previous ones;" (5) they "tell the public
something about what[] is going on in their courts;" (6) they
"contribute to efficiency since it[] is easier to make a decision if
you lean to some extent on what other people have done;" (7)
they tell clients and lawyers what the next step should be; and
(8) they serve to further accountability.' 2 In addition to the
pragmatic concerns, opponents of no-citation rules argue that
these rules are unconstitutional in that they violate freedom of
speech,2 1 separation of powers, 5 equal protection, and due
120

Id.

121

David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary,

35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1143 (2002).

In my view, when a judge looks to case law he generally looks to the most
recent statement on the rule of law by persuasive jurisdictions. While this is, of course,
oversimplified, it is essential to recognize that appellate judges have a set of principles
which lead them to automatically sift through the masses of case law to find that which
is most applicable. First among these principles is the particular factual setting of the
case at hand. Second among these is the weight of authority the law carries. Typically
a judge will look to the immediately superior federal system, in this case, the Supreme
Court, and to their own jurisdiction to find the rule of law. This argument is also not
persuasive because along with the burgeoning case law, has come an increase in law
clerks, staff attorneys and student interns. Judges, though no doubt personally
involved in much of the writing that emerges from their courtroom, are not left totally
unattended with an impregnable mass of case law to delve through before each opinion.
'
Scylla and Charybdis,supra note 3, at 5-7.
" See Thomas F. Kibbey, Standardizing the Rules Restricting Publication
122

and Citationin the FederalCourts of Appeals, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 833, 849 (2002).
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process." 6 Regardless of whether no-citation rules are
constitutional, or even desirable, the fact is that they exist and,
in existing, are creating a body of hidden law.'2 7 Simple
statistics support this proposition. For example, today the
average number of opinions per active judge is 168 while the
average number of signed opinions is only fifty-four."n
Moreover, the average number of signed opinions in 1960 was
about the same as it is today. 2' Consequently, although the
number of filings has increased exponentially, the number of
opinions issued remains approximately the same. What this
means, essentially, is that although more factual situations are
being presented to the courts for adjudication, the same
amount of actual law is being created. Inevitably, some factual
situations slip through the cracks and disappear into a world of
underground law. Since law in the U.S. legal system is based in
facts, when facts go the law loses its ability to recognize the
correct rule of law. Non-precedential decisions, at best,
stagnate rules of law, and at worst, nullify the creation of law.
B.

The Creation of Frozen Precedent

Taking the "best" case scenario as presented directly
above, where cases are non-citable and non-precedential, case

125 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901
(8th Cir. 2000)
(discussing no citation rules in light of separation of powers), vacated as moot on reh'g
en banc 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
126 Christian
F. Southwick, Unprecedented: The Eighth Circuit Repaves

Antiquas Vias with a New Constitutional Doctrine, 21 REv. LITIG. 191, 215 (2002)
(stating that "[tihe disparate impact of non-publication on certain classes of litigants
raises at least a colorable equal protection violation" and suggesting that "the inability
of litigants to cite previously decided cases as precedent could so contravene[
established legal and judicial norms that it constitutes a violation of due process").
121 In six circuits, "no-citation rules" set forth a complete
prohibition on
references to unpublished opinions within court proceedings, including briefs and
arguments. Greenwald & Schwarz, supra note 121, at 1139. Four other circuits allow
the citations for persuasive value, but disfavor them and strongly discourage their use.
Id. at 1140.
In addition, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has stated that
"[it is difficult to justify a system under which the 'unpublished' opinions of the D.C.
Circuit Court can be cited to the Seventh Circuit, but the 'unpublished' opinions of the
Seventh Circuit cannot be cited to the Seventh Circuit." See Alito Memorandum, supra
note 1.
,2
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics 2001: U.S. Court of Appeals - Judicial Caseload Profile, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa200l.pl (last visited Aug. 21, 2003).
129 RiCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 53,
154 (1996).
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law stagnates.13 As a general proposition, "[tihe common law
process of law creation never ends because each case precedent
13
adds to the corpus of case law, whether minutely or mightily." '
Thus, these precedents cause case law to be continually
refreshed by the injection of new factual situations.
Nonetheless, even where the U.S. system is functioning with a
common law methodology, there comes a point where a lawyer
or a judge "enters the system with a particular problem,
searches for, and finds a finite set of precedents.".32 At that
specific point, the rule of law governing the case at hand is
frozen, and the lawyer or judge can determine the "answer" to
her problem. However, this "answer" exists for a theoretically
limited amount of time because when a new decision is made
the applicable rule of law is ultimately changed." This
refreshing is necessary for the U.S. system to function fairly
because "[biehind each formulation of law sits one or more
specific judicial precedents with highly detailed case facts,
rationales elaborated by ... precedent-setting courts, and the
additional verbal 'shadows' cast by their judicial opinions."34
When a lawyer enters the system to follow his facts
down the line of precedents to the rule of law he has found only
the law at the moment, and a decision about his case can and
should change the law. Unfortunately, when an appellate court
deems that decision unpublishable and non-citable, it does not
add to the corpus of case law but instead becomes a tangential
and wholly particularized individual decision. The decision is
limited to the precise instance and does not elaborate a
130 It can be argued that because judges publish approximately the same

number of signed opinions today as in 1960, it must follow that, absolutely, the law has
continued to develop at a continuous rate. However, in comparative terms, case law has
stagnated because judges do not publish 80% of all decisions rendered at the appellate
level. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 2, tbl. S-3. Thus,
though the number remains constant, the percentage has significantly decreased.
It is this comparative number with which we are primarily concerned
because it divorces law from underlying factual situations. The divorce itself causes
stagnation because the law cannot react to and develop from the particular factual
situations that it is faced with. When litigation burgeons, so should the law. Since that
does not occur with the promulgation of non-precedential decisions, the law stagnates.
See supra note 118.
131 Cappalli, supra note 12, at 93.
132 Id.
The rule of law will change even where no new permutation of the rule
'
itself is advanced simply because the particularized factual situation will have been
added to the line of cases leading to the rule. Even where, however unlikely, no new
factual situation can be recognized, the rule of law is still altered, at the very least, in
its weight of persuasion or authority.
13 Cappalli, supra note 12, at 93.
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rationale that can apply in a more abstract manner to
additional factual situations. Thus, the "highly detailed case
facts, rationales... and... verbal shadows"" which create the
law in the U.S. legal system are lost and the law is frozen in
the same state that it was in prior to the current decision.'
When courts render tangential decisions over and over again,
the law remains in its current state though there was
opportunity to advance. When common law facts become
divorced from common law decisions, the law stops changing in
response to society and to the ever-developing concepts of policy
orated by that society. 3 ' Lines of precedents from which factspecific cases are removed can no longer function fairly and
efficiently as common law, and the law has stagnated.
IV.THE EFFECTS OF CONVERSION
When a layer of precedent frozen at a moment in time
becomes divorced from subsequent actual events and
situations, fact becomes subsumed under law."u Subsumption
and its effects can be understood by the analogy to the civil law
Id.
Taking this analysis further, it could be argued that because settlements
also freeze the law, and, in fact, do so to a greater extent than the vast amount of
unpublished decisions created at the appellate level today, they should also be
prohibited. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, it could be argued that every
legal dispute, whether the parties wish to be involved in a lawsuit or not, should be
forced to be adjudicated by the courts in order to render case law complete. This,
however, is not the logical extension of the argument that unpublished opinions create
code law because in the case of settlements the parties are making a decision only
between themselves. Presumably, none of the litigious parties involved in the
settlement will ever make a similar decision for other parties. As such, their decision is
made by and affects only themselves and if it is unfair, they each, theoretically, had a
part in the decision-making process. Judge-made decisions however, not only do not
involve the decision-making input of any litigious party (in the sense implied here),
but, more importantly, the judge rendering the decision is making it for other parties
and may utilize the same rule of law to render a decision for another set of parties in
the future. Thus, settlements do not rise to the level of unpublished decisions in the
creation of frozen law.
137 See Mandell, supra note 3, at 1269 ("In a hypothetical
situation, it is
conceivable that on Monday a judge may interpret a ...[factual setting] as creating a
specific right of recovery in an unpublished opinion, while on Tuesday, another judge in
the same court facing identical factual circumstances will have an opposite holding...
135
1

Subsume means "to include or place within something larger or more
comprehensive: encompass as a subordinate or component element." MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, supra note 17 (giving the example, "red, green, and yellow are
subsumed under the term 'color"). See also Cappalli, supra note 12, at 91 (subsumption
is the "final moment in the deductive process when the judge's ...mind bridges the
gap between the narrowest relevant rule of law and the specific facts of a legal
controversy").
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methodology. When precedent becomes frozen, it becomes, in
many ways, akin to the civil law code system. Thus, as in the
civil law methodology, the only way to reach this frozen
precedent, where fact analogy fails, is through logic. Though
both systems utilize both facts and logic as important factors in
legal analysis, when fact becomes subsumed under logic, the
common law system loses some necessary internal correctives
within its form of legal reasoning, and the fairness of the U.S.
system of legal reasoning is compromised.
A.

Subsumption Question:Abstraction Versus Facts

It is possible to understand the unfortunate
consequences fact subsumption yields by considering frozen
precedent in light of the Continental system. In the same way
that a code rule will be searched out, applied, and then
returned to the "drawer" in the same condition in which it is
found, frozen precedent can be interpreted, applied to a factual
situation, and then returned without any demonstrable
changes due to this application. Just as the new decision in the
code system has little to no bearing on future decisions based
on that rule of law, neither does the new common law decision.
Moreover, because the common law system does not contain
the same internal correctives as the civil law system, when the
law does not adequately reach the facts, the risk of erroneous
decision making increases.
While the civil law system appears to function well by
using logic as the lubricant of its legal analysis, in the U.S.
system logic alone cannot lead to a fair and just rule of law.
Logic, in abstraction, "is the mental operation of particular
humans operating in particular communities in particular
places ..... "', In other words, there must be someone who has
associated a generality with a certain set of particularities in
order to facilitate application. 4 ° This has occurred in the civil
law system with the interpretation and application by legal
scholars of a general thematic convention. Judges and
practitioners in the civil law system rely on academic writings
that thoughtfully bridge the gap between the abstraction and
the rule of law.' 4' However, the U.S. system, comprised of
139

Cappalli, supra note 12, at 101.

140

Id. at 99 (stating that there must always be someone to "pick or create the

word which represents a certain set of particularities").
141 Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at 1597.
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decisions made by individuals with distinct value systems, has
not set down a comprehensive scheme of logic abstraction.
Thus, logic in the U.S. system cannot reach the current
patterns of interest vying for attention within the case at hand,
and, to a lesser extent though not a lesser effect, within society
as a whole, without a recognition of the factual particularities.
In other words, it is as if several of the stepping stones, or fact
patterns, have been removed. A person jumping across now has
a far greater distance to cover. Logic, as it is used in the drawer
methodology, is not imbued in the common law system with
enough safeguards, or perhaps, the right types of safeguards, to
allow a safe and adequate bridge to be built. Thus logic fails to
provide the necessary bridge between existing precedents.
Underlying facts tie the logic abstractions of U.S. judges
to prior cases, thus increasing the chances of a fair and
equitable resolution of disputes, much like the interpretation of
legal scholars ties civil law judges. Moreover, the Continental
approach, and the legal reasoning methodology that
accompanies it, contains internal correctives that assist in
bridging the logic abstraction. First, a civil law judge, applying
the logical application of a code provision, calculates whether a
specific issue is within the meaning of a categorical provision
by "reasoning broadly, deploying the resources of history,
experience, training and purpose, along with logic.""2 A civil
law judge has the benefit of a well-developed and fairly
comprehensive set of generalities in the form of the civil code.
Most importantly, these generalities have the force of history
behind them. Though the civil system does not utilize stare
decisis,' 43 code systems have been in use since the age of the
Roman Empire'" and have been adopted by code countries with
the modifications and additions their legislatures have deemed
appropriate. "5 This has lent the civil codes, and those who
interpret those codes, an additional level of guidance perhaps
lacking in the U.S. system. The generalities employed in
reaching the rule of law have withstood the test of time in
many cases, or are, perhaps, new responses arising from the
test of time. Thus the logic necessary to bridge abstraction has

142

143
144
145

Cappalli, supra note 12, at 101.
See supra note 9 and accompanying parenthetical information.
See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 19, at 2-3.

Id.
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the assistance of both time and history in locating a fair
resolution.
Secondly, the civil code, as interpreted originally by
medieval scholars, contains a sense of morality not necessarily
present in a pervasive form throughout American precedent.'46
This is not to say that common law contains no moral values;
as a matter of fact, societal morals and values are important
concerns of judges as they make decisions. 14' However, these
concerns are not, on the whole, legislatively determined, and
thus there is no guarantee that they: (1) exist; (2) are
fundamentally the same in each situation; (3) are understood
at a level appropriate for application; or (4) are pervasive and
comprehensive. Because the civil code is legislatively
determined it is endowed with a higher presumption of
at least as
legitimacy than traditional common law decisions,
48
concerned.'
are
prescriptions
far as its moral
Finally, since civil law judges rarely affect the
generalized law, but have immense decision-making power in
each individual decision, any arbitrary decisions made are
confined to a specific dispute. 149 Since there is no binding
precedent, judges will not be inclined to follow a ruling that is
arbitrary. Instead, each judge has complete discretion to decide
her own way. Applying again the analogy to the civil law, it is
possible to understand how the absence of these internal
correctives can lead to difficulties when common law precedent
is frozen.

4

See Zaphiriou, supra note 7, at 51-52. This is not an assertion that the code

form contains a moral or value system that is superior to any individual morals or
values present in laws within the U.S. legal system. I am simply acknowledging the
single moral system based on natural law from which the code system arose. This
allowed a system to be created that was generally similar in its value system
throughout each individual code provision. In comparison, the U.S. system, where law
is decision based, has arisen from the individual perceptions of values and morals of
various men and women. Though this is an overstatement in the sense that medieval
scholars interpreting the Roman Pandect were also individuals, and, as well, various
systems of interpretative values have tended to take root in the U.S. legal system
throughout its brief history, it is nonetheless significant that there was one main
interpretive value system at the origination of code law.
147

Id.

S. Fried, Logical Foundations of Preference Aggregation, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2678, 2723 (1994) (citing Calabresi, supra note 59, at 97); see also
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 24, 29 and accompanying
text.
48 Michael

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:2

When the facts are subsumed under the law, then
experience cannot bridge the gap to the precedents."n Where
the civil law uses logic to reach the rule of law, the U.S. legal
system relies on factual experience. When factual experiences
are missing the risk arises that stones are missing from the
Stepping Stone Approach, and, therefore, that the distance
between each precedent becomes too great for common law
logic. Courts are then limited to viewing the generalities of the
rule of law, and cannot observe the actual operation of the
specific rule in a fact-specific context. Experience does not exist
without actuality: actual people doing actual things. If you
cannot reach the factual events underlying a decision, you
cannot reach the reasoning either. Without experience,
common law judges move into a role more similar to that of a
civil law judge and make the decision based upon a vast logical
leap of application of facts to law, rather than law to facts, or at
the very least, to an analogy of the facts.
This type of interpretation presents a highly increased
risk of arbitrary decision making. As a civil law decision maker
must do, the common law judge must now interpret precedent
only for the purpose of resolving the case currently before
him. 5' There is no new meaning added to the precedents, and
the common law judge has lost an important check on his
power - accountability.' When judges are permitted to stray
from established legal principles, they are then able to wield
15"

point).

.

See supra note 101 and accompanying text (providing an illustration of this

Cappalli, supra note 12, at 99 (citing Norberto Bobbio).
It is important to note at this point that litigants whose adjudication is
determined in an unpublished opinion have the same right to appeal the judgment as
do those whose decisions are entered in a published opinion. See, e.g., supra note 108
and accompanying text. Though judicial review gives a semblance of accountability to
this process, it seems that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
appropriateness of a decision when the analysis and reasoning behind the decision is
indeterminable. Judge Kozinski, one of the staunchest defenders of no-citation policies,
has himself indicated that unpublished opinions rendered by judges are '"worth
nothing at all' as precedent." Liptak, supra note 4. He further states that unpublished
opinions "[s]imply don't get vetted the way that binding opinions do." Id. In fact, Judge
Kozinski indicated that he has already altered his approach to writing unpublished
opinions and has "started saying less and less to the parties." Id. He states that an
unpublished opinion is "read by lawyers [though] [i]t shouldn't be. It's meant as a letter
from [the] court to parties ... [a]nd we would tell them much more if you didn't insist
on sharing it, if you didn't insist on using it in the next case, we [would] tell you a
whole lot more about what we're doing." Scylla and Charybdis, supra note 3, at 23.
Thus accountability is clearly frustrated by the lack of information and analysis in
unpublished opinions from which superior courts can analyze the decision being
rendered.
152
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both judicial and legislative power, increasing the risk of
'
arbitrary and tangential decisions. " Though they are still
technically bound to the rules of law established in
precedential cases, in these situations the thought and analysis
underlying the decision never surface. When judges are not
forced to adhere to or reveal the analysis leading to a specific
decision, they are not only free from one restraint on nonaccountability with regards to the decision, but are also able to
dodge difficult and time consuming issues and abandon
established rules of law. In fact, judges who do not actually pen
their reasoning are not forced to fully explore its permutations,
and in the worst case scenario, may not even understand their
own reasoning." The absence of accountability leads to the
absence of responsibility, and the absence of both breeds sloth
and indifference. '
It is important to recognize that logic is used
beneficially and necessarily under both the Continental and
the U.S. methodologies. Moreover, U.S. judges have available
for their use both deductive and inductive reasoning, as do
their Continental counterparts. Continental judges are neither
inherently better at logic application, nor even necessarily
better trained at finding and applying code or code-like rules of
law. Nor is it even the case that academics give more
legitimacy to the interpretation of rules of law in the
Continental system since the U.S. system, too, has a large
group of highly trained and prolific legal scholars. The analogy
employed here is used simply to highlight the dramatic way in
which the risks of arbitrary and tangential decision making are
increased in a system not traditionally designed for the
interpretation of stagnate rules of law.
V.

INTERNAL CORRECTIVES

Though the U.S. system contains its own internal
correctives, these correctives are designed to protect a system
that is functioning as a common law system. When the system
begins to take on attributes of a civil law system, then it acts
outside the protective scope of the common law correctives.

'5
154

Schiavoni, supra note 121, at 1863-64.
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 94, at 284.

155Id.
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Public Policy

One internal corrective inherent in the common law
system is the tradition of looking to public policy when
balancing the interests involved in legal disputes."' When
precedent becomes frozen judges lose the ability to recognize
the patterns of interest belonging to each party.'57 In general,
the theory underlying judicial decision making that prevails in
a legal system, whether common or civil, affects judicial
practice by reminding judges of the patterns of interest that
are demanding recognition in each instance." Specifically
looking to the U.S. legal system, with its dependence upon
investigation and elucidation of facts, and the application of
facts to a series of previously decided cases, "directs the judge's
attention to the pattern of interests pressing for recognition.""'
By forcing a judge to delve deep into the specific facts of the
case at hand, and apply these to analogous fact patterns from
which judicial reasoning arose, the judge is forced to see the
interests vying for satisfaction."' It is only within the context of
a specific fact pattern that a judge can effectively determine
whether the interest of X should sacrifice to the interest of Y.
Thus, policy considerations allow societal concerns to
press for recognition. However, when decisions are nonprecedential, the specific analogies of multiple factual scenarios
are hidden from view."' More importantly, the reasoning and
societal purposes shadowing these specific decisions are hidden
from view. As such, the decision maker is faced with a layer of
frozen precedent that .is divorced, not only from fact, but also
from current societal concerns. Again, the Johnson example
aptly demonstrates this bifurcation of law and facts."2 In that
case, the inmate was in fact homosexual and allegedly denied a
position based on this fact. The legal principle that grew out of
that fact was that legislation singling out homosexuals might
be subject to strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection
Clause. However, in not publishing this case, a future
1'5 See VON MEHREN
157

& GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1139.

Id.

158 Id.

Id.
Id.
161 Richman & Reynolds, supra note
94, at 282-83 (stating that "even if the
opinion does no more than restate existing legal doctrine, it can show how the doctrine
applies to different facts").
'62 See discussion supra Part III and notes 102-10 and accompanying
text.
15'
160
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homosexual litigant could not demonstrate that the Fourth
Circuit had ever applied the fact of homosexuality to its equal
protection jurisprudence. As such, the facts have become
divorced from the law.
While it is nonetheless true that many unpublished
opinions are available for a judge to consider, if not cite or use
as precedent, it seems unlikely that judges who must utilize
unpublished opinions to control burgeoning dockets in the first
place will have the time or inclination to sift through
unpublished opinions that are not even the law when
researching a factual situation before them. However, whether
a judge would take the time to sift through tens of thousands of
fact-sensitive unpublished opinions is irrelevant because when
the facts are divorced from the rule of law the risk of
arbitrariness arises."3 It is this risk - this new element of
discordance - that is of the biggest concern.
Additionally, it may be argued that patterns of interest
cannot adequately surface in individual cases and will,
therefore, mitigate the risk discussed above. It is true that the
patterns vying for attention absolutely cannot surface in one or
two individual cases. This problem is precisely why frozen
precedent substantially increases the risk of arbitrariness:
because the patterns of interests cannot adequately surface in
individual cases. Just as public studies, or surveys, utilize a
large portion of public opinion to understand societal interests,
the more thoroughly fact patterns are unearthed and the more
thoroughly judges, practitioners, and litigants can understand
the appropriate legal and judicial rules of law, and the public
policies that underlie them. The more fact patterns are hidden,
the less able parties are to determine the rule of law.
B.

The JudicialBench

The manner in which judges view their function, ascend
to the bench, procure advancement and compensation, and
perceive their position in society, creates internal correctives
that protect a legal system from arbitrary decision making.
Within the U.S. system, "judges are likely to find selfexpression in judicial lawmaking."" They recognize that they
are not simply deciding disputes, but are creating law and
16

See Alito Memorandum, supra note 1 (stating that "[t]he thirteen courts of

appeals have cumulatively issued tens of thousands of 'unpublished opinions').
'64 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra note 7, at 1150.
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affecting the interpretation of rules of law down through
history. Though this sounds like a frightening proposition, the
U.S. legal system contains checks and balances that limit
judicial discretion and protect against arbitrary decision
making.
First, the common law is historically based on tradition,
and judicial law has an inherent respect for this tradition."
This respect for tradition, grounded in stare decisis, prevents a
judge from making radical and vast changes to the rules of law
before him." Second, as a pragmatic consideration, a judge who
makes a vast and radical change to existing rules of law runs a
high risk of being overturned by a superior court.'6" No judge
likes his reasoning and decisions called into question.'r8
Adhering closely to fundamental precedents or making
minimal and incremental changes significantly decreases the
likelihood that a reviewing court will find reversible error in
the judge's decision. Third, the common law judge, in the case
of opinions that are fully within the common law system," not
only decides the cases and writes the opinions, but signs the
opinions as well. A judge in the common law system cannot
hide behind the bench.' 0 Instead, the decisions made, and the
names of those who made them, are public information information that is out there for all to trace back to the

16 Luban, supra note 8, at 1036. Luban
discusses Otto Neurath's vision of a
ship being built at sea as an example of how tradition adheres the common law to a
slow and incremental pace of change. Much like a ship being built at sea, where only a
few planks can be replaced at a time, only a few practices at a time can be reformed
under the common law, while the rest must be "accepted on reflex." Id. (citing Otto
Neurath, Protokollsatze, 3 ERKENNTIS 204 (1932), discussed in WILLARD VAN ORMAN
QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 123-24 (1960)).
166 Id.
167 Stein, Roman Law, supra note 23, at 1596-97
(stating that the common law

judge, as the "oracle of the law.., takes personal responsibility for his decisions").
16 Being overturned is viewed as a significant strike against a
judge's judicial
capabilities. Id.
169 This includes opinions that are signed,
published, and citable.
170 VON MEHREN & GORDLEY, supra
note 7, at 1140. Von Mehren and Gordley
state:
An American decision begins, as a rule, with an elaborate statement of the
facts and includes a careful discussion of precedents. The name of the author
of the opinion is given, as are the names of the other judges on the court
where the case was decided by a collegiate bench. Dissents are recorded.
Concurring and dissenting opinions are permitted and are relatively
frequent. When the decision is later before another court as precedent, it thus
contains a record, at least in part, of the considerations that lay behind it and
of the doubts some judges may have had as to the results reached.
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source.' 1 Thus, opinions that judges write typically are well
reasoned in great part because this sense of accountability
keeps 72 a judge from straying too far from the precedential
path.'
However, when a common law judge is presented with
frozen precedent, like a code in a civil law environment, the
risk of arbitrary decision making increases, simply because of
the way each system views the function of a judge. In the
common law system, judges can affect a far-reaching change on
the general law, but are constrained by the tradition-based
notion of stare decisis. Unfortunately, when this notion is
eliminated, the common law judge has potentially unlimited
discretion to make decisions in the specific case at hand, much
as a civil law judge does. While it is certainly true that the risk
of being overturned and the respect for tradition continue to
provide an important check on unfair decision making, without
the proper operation of stare decisis volatility will increase, and
arbitrary decision making with it.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to decrease the risk of arbitrary and tangential
decisions stemming from frozen precedent, the U.S. system
must either add internal correctives that mirror those within a
civil law system or allow citation to unpublished opinions. The
former recommendation would not only be highly disruptive to
the U.S. system as it exists today, but impossible to implement.
In order to accomplish this task, the circuit courts would have
to approve and adopt additional protections against
arbitrariness in the form of a nationwide moral code from
which to begin value-based analysis, authoritative reliance on
legal academics, and a bureaucratic form of recruitment,
171 This sense of responsibility is another rationale underlying no-citation
policies. The idea is that when judges are faced with an extraordinary amount of cases
to decide, they are unable to write reasoned opinions for each and every one of them.
See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 4 (citing Judge Alex Kozinski as stating that writing a
binding opinion "'is an exacting and extremely time-consuming task' that sometimes
requires 70 or 80 drafts over several months").
17 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 94,
at 282-83.
When a judge makes no attempt to provide a satisfactory explanation of the
result, neither the actual litigants nor subsequent readers of an opinion can
know whether the judge paid careful attention to the case and decided the
appeal according to the law or whether the judge relied on impermissible factors such as race, sex, political influence, or merely the flip of a coin.
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advancement, and compensation of judges.'7' Even if the circuit
courts were to come to a consensus to implement these
modifications, the United States legal educators would then
have to come together to change legal education from case
method to lecture method. Clearly these changes are not going
to happen in the United States.
Likewise, we could take the route of requiring that all
opinions be published. This would be met with extreme
opposition, however, precisely because the rationales
underlying the implementation of no-citation rules have not
been eliminated.'7 4 On the contrary, caseloads continue to
burgeon and there seems to be no sign of a sudden increase in
appointments of circuit court judges. Thus, we are left only
with the option of permitting citation to non-precedential
opinions. Allowing citation to non-precedential opinions, and
therefore, all opinions rendered, will allow each factual
situation to influence precedential case law. Though
unpublished opinions may not be precedential in and of
themselves, permitting their citation, even in a mere
persuasive form, allows litigants to conceptualize the rules of
law affecting their specific factual situation to the extent that
elements of their factual situation have been previously
adjudicated.'75 Furthermore, it will allow judges to reach the
true policies and values underlying precedents, as well as be
able to more clearly recognize and conceptualize the patterns of
interests vying for attention. In this way, though precedent will
still be frozen as far as its ability to bind subsequent courts, it
will not be converted to the functional equivalent of a civil code
because judges will be able to utilize experience in making
decisions, and will not be forced to utilize logic principles alone.
Though not as efficient as maintaining full precedential case
law in all situations, persuasive opinions are still persuasive,
and litigants will be able to utilize them thusly.
Allowing citation to unpublished opinions is not only
logistically easier to implement than the previous route
described, but is also the way the federal appellate system is
moving. At the May 2003 Advisory Committee meeting, the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules approved by a vote of
"' See discussion supra Part II.A.
'74 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
,75 There is a great deal of legal jurisprudence which argues against allowing
citation to unpublished opinions for reasons other than those set forth in this Note. See
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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seven to one, with one abstention, Proposed Appellate Rule
32.1, a rule that would require all federal circuit courts to
permit the citation of unpublished opinions in court
documents. 76' After a period of incubation through various
committees, the Supreme Court would have the opportunity to
adopt the rule by May 2005, and it would go into effect by
December 2005.7" Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 is considered a
major development because there has been such a high level of
'
resistance to its implementation for over twenty years.
However, Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 demonstrates the legal
community's "growing 'aversion to secret law.' 1. 9 This trend is
further justified by the fact that both the Texas Supreme Court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed their restrictions on citing non-precedential
176

See Alito Memorandum, see ADVISORY COMMITTEE MINUTES, supra note 1,

at 28-31, 35-39. See also Liptak, supra note 4; Federal Rulemaking - Advisory Rules
Committees Actions: Fall 2002 Meetings, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
177 At this time, Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 has been published
for
comments, and the bench and bar will have until approximately February 2004 to
make submissions. These comments will then be considered by the Advisory
Committee at its Spring 2004 meeting, at which time determinations with regards to
suggested modifications will be made, and a vote will be taken for approval. If the
Advisory Committee votes to approve the Rule, it will then go to the Standing
Committee for consideration at its June 2004 meeting. If the Standing Committee
approves the rule, it will go to the Judicial Conference in September 2004, and, if
approved at this stage, on to the Supreme Court which will have until May 1, 2005 to
decide whether to adopt it. After its adoption, Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 will go to
Congress, and would ultimately take effect on December 1, 2005. Committee for the
at
2003),
29,
(Oct.
Events
and
News
Law,
of
Rule
http://www.nonpublication.com/EVENTS.HTML.
Proposed Appellate Rule reads as follows:
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be
imposed upon the citation of judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "nonprecedential," "not precedent," or the like, unless that
prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the
citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition that is not available in
a publicly accessible electronic database must file and serve a
copy of that opinion, order, judgment, or other written
disposition with the brief or other paper in which it is cited.
See Alito Memorandum, supra note 1.
178 Liptak, supra note 4 (citing Arthur D. Hellman, law professor at the
University of Pittsburgh).
179 Id.
(citing Stephen R. Barnett, law professor at the University of
California).
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opinions on January 1, 2003.'" Though Proposed Appellate
Rule 32.1 is "extremely limited" because "[ilt takes no position
on whether refusing to treat an 'unpublished' opinion as
binding precedent is constitutional," under its rubric "a court of
appeals may not prohibit a party from citing to an
'unpublished' opinion for its persuasive value or for any other
reason.' 8' Moreover, adoption of Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1
does not mean that unpublished opinions would become
precedential.'82 In fact, of the three alternative forms of
Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1 considered, not one prohibited
the judiciary from issuing non-precedential decisions entirely."
Although merely persuasive authority, the ability to cite
to unpublished opinions would help alleviate the possibility of
arbitrary decisions resulting from frozen precedent. In this
situation frozen precedent would continue to occur, however,
judges and litigants would at least be able to review all the
factual situations that relate to their own circumstances. Thus
judges could use experience rather than logic to deduce the
appropriate balance of equities between litigants. Facts would
no longer be separated from the rule of law, the patterns of
interests would surface in a more meaningful way, and the
risks of arbitrary decision making would decrease.
Whatever the benefits or risks of incorporating Proposed
Appellate Rule 32.1, it is clear that its adoption will partially
remedy the negative effects of unpublished opinions. ' "
180
181
182

Id.
See Alito Memorandum, supra note 1.
Id.

The arguments about whether citation of unpublished decisions should be
allowed is one of three related issues involving such opinions. The second is
whether courts are bound to follow such decisions as precedent. And the third
is whether litigants are even entitled to a statement of the appeals court's
reasoning. About 1,350 of the 29,000 decisions issued by the federal appeals
courts last year consisted of a word or phrase (usually, 'affirmed') and
contained no reasoning.
Id.

183 Advisory Committee Minutes, supra
note 1, at 22-39.
The Reporter said that he was presenting to the Committee three alternative
drafts of a proposed Rule 32.1. The first - Alternative A - was the broadest.
It specifically authorizes courts to issue non-precedential opinions and
permits their citation without qualification. The second - Alternative B takes a middle position. Unlike Alternative A, it addresses only the citation of
non-precedential opinions. However, unlike Alternative C, it permits the
citation of such opinions without qualification. The third - Alternative C - is
the narrowest. It addresses only the citation of non-precedential opinions,
and it permits such citation only in limited circumstances.
Id. at 35.
" See discussions supra Parts II.B and
III.
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However, only full precedential weight will completely
eradicate the problems of frozen precedent, as demonstrated in
the analogy with the civil law code. Permitting persuasive
citation in all circuit courts is a step closer to the solution, and
is a step that is not only possible, but likely to occur. Yet that is
not enough. Unpublished opinions do not permit precedent to
grow. Stones will continue to be missing along the path to the
rule of law, and judges will be forced to use logic to span a gap
that is just too large.
VII. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the virus of unpublished opinions
creates a layer of frozen precedent within the U.S. legal
system. This is a result of decisions that do not build, either
minutely or mightily, upon the system of precedents binding
each particular rule of law. Because under the federal circuit
courts' no-citation rules decisions do not have to be either
published or precedential, they exist, in a sense, out of time. In
other words, they do not affect the law and cannot lead
practitioners or judges to a decision by increasing clarity or
understanding. This frozen precedent, in effect, treats a
common law system like a civil law system because it begins to
exist like a code. The facts become subsumed under the law,
and a judge must use logic, rather than experience, to reach a
decision. Under the common law system, this can never truly
be done.
It has been said that "[t]o the logic of civil law, one must
oppose the pragmatism of the common law. To the relative
rigidity of the former, one must point out the flexibility of the
latter. To the clarity and transparency of one, one must oppose
the relative opacity of the other."'" While each system functions
successfully, each also contains its own internal correctives
that inherently respond to threats of arbitrariness and
unfairness. It is important to recognize that these arbitrary
decisions are not necessarily intentional - rather, it is a
function of frozen precedent that eliminates important internal
correctives and checks and balances. Nonetheless, these
tangential and arbitrary decisions will ultimately degrade the
function, efficiency, faith in and fundamental fairness of the

185 Bruno, supra note 24, at 7.
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U.S. legal system."a And although Proposed Appellate Rule 32.1
takes an important step towards correcting the risks of
unpublished opinions, it is only through the complete
eradication of the use of unpublished, non-precedential
decisions that the common law can function in a fair and just
manner.
Kristen Marie Hansen'

"6 "Frederick Kempin suggests that without a firm doctrine of stare decisis
'courts could search for the 'true' law without regard to any binding authority in prior
cases'. .. ." Mandell, supra note 3, at 1288 (citing Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent
and Stare Decisis: The CriticalYears, 1800 to 1850, 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 28, 33 (1959)).
B.A. Brigham Young University 1998; J.D. Candidate 2004, Brooklyn Law
School. Publication Editor of the Brooklyn Law Review 2003-04. The author would like
to express her appreciation to the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review, especially Editorin-Chief, John Rizio-Hamilton, Managing Editor, Amity Boye, and Executive Articles
Editor Gregory Wicker. In addition, the author would like to express special
appreciation to Professor Mary Ellen Fullerton, and Mr. James N. Ishida from the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

